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Papers that examine fiscal competition for mobile factors of production commonly 
employ simultaneous move games between two states and focus on the inefficiency of 
the equilibria.  Most often, the existence of the equilibrium is left unexplored.  By 
examining decision making by governments that make only constrained efficient choices, 
we derive sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria when there are multiple 
policy instruments, multiple mobile factors and many different production processes.  
Convexity of the minimum cost function, "dual" to the factor preferences and production 
function primitives, is sufficient to ensure the existence of equilibrium.  We also find that 
equilibrium may not exist because of the economies of scale inherent in provision of 
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I. Introduction. 
An extensive literature has emerged exploring the properties of Nash equilibria in games 
of fiscal competition between states within federations, and between nation-states within 
regional unions.  Surveys of this literature can be found in Wilson and Wildasin (2004), 
Wilson (1999), as well as Cremer, Fourgeaud, Leite Monteiro and Pestieau (1996).  The 
key idea to emerge from the early papers is that equilibrium outcomes are inefficient 
because fiscal competition creates fiscal externalities which lead to inefficient provision 
of local public goods and a misallocation of mobile factors of production, in particular 
capital, between the competing states.  These papers assume that governments are 
benevolent welfare maximizers; fiscal competition is, therefore, welfare reducing, 
requiring corrective policies or cooperation to achieve Pareto optimal outcomes 
(Wildasin (1989)). 
 Subsequent work has explored the potential for fiscal competition to be welfare 
enhancing.  Much of this work dates from the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) Leviathan 
model where governments are revenue maximizers.  In this world, fiscal competition 
provides a welfare improving constraint on the taxing powers of government.  Overall, 
whether fiscal competition is welfare enhancing or reducing depends therefore on the 
degree to which governments pursue welfare maximizing versus revenue maximizing 
goals (Edwards and Keen (1996)). 
 Recently, researchers have examined the empirical importance of the costs and 
benefits of fiscal competition (Parry (2003)) and the welfare gains from regional tax 
coordination (Sorensen (2004)).  Others have examined why there has not in practice 
been a ‘race to the bottom’ as some fiscal competition models predict (Mendoza and 
Tesar (2005)).  This has been an especially important issue in the European Union where 
the potential need for tax coordination has been much debated.     
 The standard fiscal competition model employed has its foundation in the papers 
by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wildasin (1988) though the models developed 
since this early work vary in terms of hypotheses about how states engage in fiscal 
competition.  For example, differing assumptions are made about the degree of firm 
competition, regional factor market integration, the extent to which mobile factors are 
attached to their home state, the types of mobile factors over which states compete, the 
   
   
vector of tax and policy instruments at the disposal of states and the structure of the 
games themselves (e.g. simultaneous, sequential).     
 The focus of analysis has been on characterizing the properties of Nash 
equilibrium outcomes with most papers assuming the existence of equilibrium (for 
example, Wildasin (1988), page 233).  Few have directly confronted the difficult question 
of whether equilibrium exists.  One exception is to be found in the paper by Wilson 
(1991) who analyzes linear state best reply curves.  Wildasin (1991) also examines 
existence for a series of special cases with quasi-linear preferences and specific 
production technologies.  Bucovetsky (1991) chooses a specific quadratic form for the 
production function which makes the marginal product of capital linear in taxes.  This is 
sufficient to yield linear best reply curves and existence for the model constructed.   
Laussel and Le Breton (1998) attempt a more ambitious proof of existence.  They 
adopt most features of the standard model (e.g. as employed by Zodrow and Mieskowski 
(1986), Wildasin (1988)) though assume that mobile capital is owned by absentee 
landlords, or if owners live within a state, that they are disenfranchised.  The effect is to 
exclude capital income from state objective functions.  Laussel and Le Breton also 
suppose that state objective functions are linear in public and private consumption goods 
though this strips the fiscal competition game of its public good dimension.  As will be 
seen in this paper, inclusion of public goods in the policy vector is important for the 
consideration of existence.   
Bayindir-Upmann and Ziad (2005) revisit the existence problem and acknowledge 
that ‘…the existence issue is hard to deal with under the notion of a Nash equilibrium’3.  
They go on to demonstrate existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in tax rates for the 
symmetric case using the concept of a second order locally consistent equilibrium – a 
weaker equilibrium notion than the Nash equilibrium. 
 The purpose of this paper is to tackle the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium in 
fiscal competition games and try to get further insight into this thorny issue.  This is done 
by first developing a simple model based on what is perceived to be the standard model 
found in the literature.  The simple model is of a regional bloc made up of j =1,2 states 
which share a common factor market with one mobile factor which can be thought of as 
                                                 
3 See page 2 of Bayandir-Upmann and Ziad. 
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capital or labor.  State j has two policy instruments, a per unit tax/subsidy and a local 
public good; thus, the model captures the tax and expenditure aspects of a state’s budget4.  
State j produces a numeraire good using fixed factors and the single mobile factor 
together with a quasi-concave production technology.  The mobile factor receives a state 
specific payoff which, for given values of the state policy instruments, is a monotonically 
decreasing and concave function of the supply of the mobile factor in the state.  By 
including the amount of the local public good as an argument of the mobile factor’s 
payoff function, and the state production technologies, the public good is productivity – 
enhancing.  The mobile factor migrates between the states within the regional bloc to 
satisfy an equal payoff condition.  The regional bloc’s mobile factor market is also 
integrated with the world mobile factor market and its supply to the regional bloc is a non 
decreasing function of the (equal) payoff received within the bloc.  Thus, the model 
allows for integration between the regional and world mobile factor markets in a way 
which caters for the two extreme cases of full integration, no integration, and all the cases 
in between (partial integration).  
 A state objective function is then developed which is separable into a benefit – the 
economic residual of the state - and cost component.  It is argued that in a fiscal 
competition game with its neighbor, state j will wish to choose its tax/subsidy and levels 
of public good provision policies to maximize the difference between benefit and cost, 
for given policies adopted by the neighboring state.  This is shown to be equivalent to the 
dual problem of choosing tax/subsidy and public good policies to attract some desired 
level of mobile factor, at least cost.  From this dual state optimization problem a state 
specific cost function is derived which expresses the least cost of achieving a given 
supply of the mobile factor in a state, conditional on the policies adopted by the 
neighboring state.  Since the benefit component of the state objective is quasi concave in 
mobile factor supply existence is shown to depend only on the convexity of the state j 
cost function in the supply of the mobile factor.   
                                                 
4 The term regional bloc is used to encompass federations which have states or provinces, and regional 
unions of states, such as the European Union, which have independent nation states.  It might also be more 
widely interpreted to include unitary states with decentralized systems of pubic finance (e.g. local 
jurisdictions) where there is the potential for fiscal competition.  
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The insight that fiscal competition games can be thought of as dual games where 
the state objective is to choose policies to achieve a desired supply of mobile factors, 
conditional on neighbor state policies, and the result that existence depends only on the 
convexity of the underlying state j cost function, are key contributions of the paper.  
However, there is more.  Using two examples these results are extended to explore the 
implications (for existence) of the presence of public goods in the policy vector.  One 
example assumes quasi linear preferences and the other Leontieff preferences.  It is 
shown with both examples that convexity is not assured when there are economies of 
scale associated with the vector of public policies.  One policy choice in particular, the 
level of output of local public goods, is prone to creating economies of scale and non 
convexity, except in the case where it is sufficiently crowded (or ‘super crowded’).  
Hence, fiscal competition models which include insufficiently crowded public goods in 
the policy vector potentially have a problem with existence.  The quasi linear example is 
also used to show that the only equilibrium which can arise in a fiscal competition model 
with pure local public goods and symmetric states (a case often examined), is one in 
which one state ceases to exist. 
 In the final sections of the paper the existence results obtained with the two state, 
two instrument and one mobile factor model are generalized to a model of a regional bloc 
with many states, multiple policy instruments and many mobile factors of production 
(e.g. different types of capital and labor).  The existence results are then formally stated 
and proved in two theorems using the generalized model. 
Before commencing, three points should be noted.  First, the assumption that the 
state benefit is to maximize the economic residual of the state implies that income from 
the mobile factor accrues to non-resident mobile factor owners.  This is the absentee 
capital owner assumption adopted by Laussel and Le Breton.  The assumption is made to 
allow us to separate the state benefit and cost functions and, thus,  to focus on the role of 
the cost function in explaining existence, and on the implications of economies of scale in 
public policies.   
 Second, use of the dual state optimization problem where states choose their 
policies to obtain a given quantity of mobile factor at least cost is a novel approach to 
modeling fiscal competition games.  The advantage of using the dual is that it simplifies 
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the sufficient conditions needed for existence; they can be stated in terms of 
straightforward convexity conditions on a cost function, conditional on the concavity of 
the benefit function.  Application of the dual in this context implies that state behavior is 
‘constrained Pareto efficient’ as defined in Wilson (1991); that is, conditional on the 
instruments at their disposal, the policies adopted by other states and feasibility, the 
government of each state chooses an outcome such that it cannot make a citizen that it 
cares about better off without making another worse off.  It should also be noted that 
sufficient and not necessary conditions for existence are derived.  Thus, equilibrium may 
exist even if the convexity condition on the cost function is not satisfied.  
 Third, two prominent papers in the literature, Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) 
and Wildasin (1988) have formed the foundation for the standard model adopted in many 
subsequent papers.  The simple primal model adopted in this paper has many of the 
features of the standard model developed in those foundation papers.  This implies that 
the problem of non existence also potentially arises in these two prominent papers, and 
hence may be an issue in later research which adopt a similar modeling structure.  For 
example, in the Wildasin (1988) paper states have pure local public goods in their policy 
vector – as noted above the results here suggest that un-crowded public goods cause non 
convexity in the cost function, and potentially, non existence.  The Wildasin paper also 
deals with symmetric outcomes as do many subsequent models; however, the quasi linear 
example demonstrates that this leads to an equilibrium in which one state fails to exist.       
 The outline of the paper is as follows:  Section II sets up the two state one mobile 
factor and two instrument model of a regional bloc.  In Section III the separable cost and 
benefit parts of the state objective function are set up and the properties of the cost 
function in particular are explored.  Section IV explains the sufficient condition for 
existence as a convexity condition on the cost function, conditional on concavity of the 
benefit function.  In Section V the problems that public goods pose for existence are 
explored using two examples, one with quasi-linear preferences and the other with 
Leontief preferences.  Section VI provides more general results by extending the model 




   
   
II. Two State, One Mobile Factor and Two Instrument Model.  
Assume a simple fiscal competition model with one mobile factor and two states, labeled 
j = 1,2.  In order to economize on the presentation the subscript j (=1,2) is used to 
identify the decision making state, and  -j to denote its neighbor.  Each state has a distinct 
production technology and two policy instruments.  The states are linked through a 
common factor market as part of a regional bloc.  Later, in Section VI, it is shown that 
the results generalize to a world in which there are many states with multiple policy 
instruments, and mobile factors of production.  The advantage of the simple model is that 
it allows us to focus on existence in terms of conditions on a state specific cost function 
and highlight the problem that public goods cause for existence.  
 
(a) Production Technology 
Each state has potentially different production technologies which yield output of a 
numeraire commodity.   Whilst the numeraire commodities produced by the states may, 
or may not, be the same, their prices are assumed to be fixed.  The quantity of the 
numeraire produced in state j, multiplied by the fixed price, is the output of the state jy .  
State output is a strictly quasi concave function of the amount of a single mobile factor  
employed within the state.  The mobile factor can be thought of as labor or capital.  The 
total quantity of the mobile factor available to the regional bloc is 
in
1n n n2= + .  As is 
shown later, n can vary as the mobile factor moves in and out of the regional bloc 
depending on the within-bloc reward relative to its reward elsewhere, and is free to move 
without cost or restriction between the two states.  Also, let N be the world supply of the 
mobile factor where .   n N≤
 The government of state j has two policy instruments, a unit tax/subsidy  where 
positive values imply a subsidy and negative values a tax, and a local public good, .  
The policy vector of state j is defined as 
js
jq
( ),j j js q Sσ j= ∈
1S S S
 where  is the set of feasible 
strategies.  The strategy set for the two states is 
jS
2= ×  which is assumed to be a non-
empty, convex and compact sub set of some Euclidian space, that is, MS ∈ .  
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The local public good is productivity enhancing and also enters each state’s 
production function.5  Output in each state is strictly quasi-concave in the quantity of the 
public good supplied.  The state-specific technologies are therefore specified by the 
production function 
 ( , )j j j jy f n q= .       (2.1) 
The marginal product of the mobile factor is always positive while the marginal 
product of the local public good is non-negative.  The weaker inequality for the public 
good is chosen to allow for the possibility that the good may be one that only enhances 
the welfare of the mobile factor (see later) without increasing productivity.  We also 
assume that the marginal productivity of one input is not diminished by the quantity of 
the other.  These conditions are  
2
0,   0,   0j j j
j j j j
f f f
n q n q
∂ ∂ ∂
> ≥
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
≥
that6   
 
. (2.2)  
The addition of one further assumption simplifies the later analysis in that it 
ensures that the excess of state output over the payment to the mobile factor (residual) is 









≥ .  (2.3)  




( ) ( )
,
,j j jj j j j
jn∂
It follows from the assumptions stated above that the mobile factor return in each st
monotonically decreasing in the quantity employed (
f n q
w w n q
∂
= = .     (2.4) 
ate is 
diminishing returns) and non-
ecreasing in the quantity of the local public good.  
                                                
d
 
5 For example, public infrastructure investment in roads enhances the efficiency of distribution. 
6 A similar condition is employed by Laussel and Le Breton. 
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(b) Mobile Factor ‘Payoff’  
The mobile factor ‘payoff’ jP  in state j is a function of the policy vector of state j and the 
uantity of the mobileq  factor present in the state,  
 ( , )j j j jP P nσ= .       (2.5) 
Since the public policy is measured as its positive contribution to mobile fa or ct welfare 
(e.g., subsidies instead of taxes) ( , )j j jP nσ  is monotonically increasing in jσ . 
Consider the ca r is labor and the payoff is utility – here 
the payoff function is ( ( , ) , )j j j j j j jP u w n q s q= + e assume that the utility function is 
concave in income and the public good.  Since ( )jw
se where the mobile facto
.  W
⋅  is monotonically decreasing in jn , 
utility is monotonically decreasing in jn .  Altern  mobile fa
to be capital the payoff is sim y the net return, ( , ) ( , )j j j j j j jP n w n q s
atively, if we consider the r cto
pl σ = + .  Th
monotonically decreasing in jn  and quasi-concave in the public good and the 
tax/subsidy.  Thus, for capital and labor the payoffs are strictly quasi-concave in the 
public policies, j
is is 
σ , and monotonically decreasing in the supply of the mobile factor, 
r j =1
j  n
fo ,2.  Also, it is assumed that ( , )j j jP nσ  is positive and finite for all (0, ]n n∈ .  
 The monotonic and quasi-concavity features of the mobile factor payoff functio
follow from the ‘primitives’ of the production technology and preferences.  As will be 
seen below, these features of the mobile factor payoff function are pivotal to formulating 
n 




Keen and Marchand (1997).  Papers that accommodate both extremes - fully closed and 
th
 
(c) Mobile Factor Market Equilibrium Conditions 
Fiscal competition models commonly suppose that there is a given amount of a single
mobile factor within the regional bloc which migrates without cost between states to 
equate some equal return condition; utility for labor and after tax marginal product for 
capital.  A few papers allow integration between the regional bloc’s mobile factor marke
and world factor markets (integration).  Examples of papers which allow for fully open
factor markets include Oates and Schwab (1988), Bocovetsky and Wilson (1991) and 
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open mobile factor markets - and the intermediate cases of partially open markets, 
include Sorensen (2003), as well as Petchey and Shapiro (2002).  
 In this paper the mobile factor is allowed to migrate without cost or attachment to 
place between the two states, and also between the regional bloc and the rest of the world 
in such a way that captures the extremes of fully open and closed markets, and all cases 
in between (partial integration).  This implies that the existence result holds for this quite 
general case of factor market integration, as well as the more restrictive case of closed 
markets usually found in the literature.  To economize on the presentation in this and the 
following section the subscript j ( = 1,2 ) is used to indicate the decision making state and 
–j to indicate its regional partner.  The only restriction placed on migration between the 
bloc and the world is that it responds rationally to the within-bloc mobile factor payoff.   
Within the regional bloc the following mobile factor market payoff condition 
holds 
 ( , ) ( , )j j j j j jP n P nσ σ− − −= .                                                          (2.6) 
The supply of the mobile factor to the regional bloc denoted as n is a monotonically non-
decreasing function of the within bloc (equal) payoff.  It can, therefore, be expressed as a 
functional relation 
 ( ( , ))j j j j jn n n n P nσ−= + = .                                           (2.7) 
This functional form encompasses the case of a fully closed regional factor market in 
which n is unresponsive to changes in the regional payoff, a regional factor market that is 
fully open to the world (the within-region mobile factor payoff is equal to the world 
payoff) and the partial integration cases in between.  It is important to note that the 
regional mobile factor supply function is non-decreasing in both policies and 
monotonically increasing in . ( )jP ⋅
 
(d) Concavity and Continuity Conditions 
The mobile factor equilibrium conditions (2.6) and (2.7), and the concavity and 
continuity properties of the mobile factor payoff function which arise from the underlying 
primitives of the production technology and preferences, are now used to demonstrate 
that the supply of the mobile factor to any one state within the regional bloc is a 
 9
   
   
continuous and strictly quasi-concave function of its policy choices, conditional on the 
choices made by its neighbor.  Quasi-concavity and continuity of a state’s mobile factor 
supply in its strategy choice is a crucial part of our discussion of existence and the 
features of the cost function sufficient to ensure existence.   
The mobile factor market equilibrium conditions (2.6) and (2.7) can be written as 
one implicit function7 
 ( , , ) ( , ) ( , ( ( , )) ) 0j j j j j j j j j j j jh n P n P n P n nσ σ σ σ σ− − −= − − =   (2.8) 
As shown in section (b) above ( , )j j jP nσ  is monotonically decreasing in jn  for all jσ .  
Therefore, the implicit function (2.8) is monotonically decreasing in jn .  Since 
( , )j j jP nσ  is continuous in jn  then ( )h ⋅  is also continuous in mobile factor supply jn .  
We now state and prove two propositions about the mobile factor market equilibrium 
condition (2.8) which are crucial to our analysis of existence and the cost function.  
 
Proposition 1: For j S jσ ∈
(
 there is a unique  that satisfies the mobile factor market 
equilibrium condition, 
jn
, , ) 0j j jh nσ σ− = .  This implies a functional relationship between 
 and jn jσ , conditional on jσ− .  In turn, this implies that we can define 
  ( , )j j jn σ σ− .       (2.9) 
The proof of this is provided for the generalized version of the model presented later in 
the paper – see Section VI - where we have multiple mobile factors, instruments and 
states.  The proof of the more general version of the proposition holds for the simple 
model we are dealing with here and therefore is not stated.  Similarly, with the next 
proposition, 
 
Proposition 2: ( , )j j jn σ σ−  is a strictly quasi-concave and continuous function of 
 and −j jσ σ .  
 
                                                 
7 From (2.7) we can see that ( ( , ))j j j j jn n p n nσ− = − .  Using this in (2.6) yields the implicit function (2.8).  
For mobile factor market equilibrium we must have ( , , ) 0j j jh nσ σ− = .   
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Again, the proof for this proposition is provided later in the paper - see proof for 
proposition 4 in Section VI - for the generalized model with multiple mobile factors, and 
hence is not stated here.   
 Having described the mobile factor equilibrium conditions, and shown the strict 
quasi-concavity and continuity conditions of state specific mobile factor supply in state 
strategies, conditional on neighboring state strategies, we next consider the objective of 
each state government.  This, in turn, leads into our analysis of existence using the 
concavity and continuity conditions above. 
 
III. State Objectives 
State decision making is now examined in two parts.  The first calculates, for each 
potential quantity of the mobile factor in state j, the least cost that needs to be incurred by 
the state to obtain that supply.  The next part shows how the state will choose the mobile 
factor supply.  This is the quantity that maximizes the difference between the benefit 
created for the state, or state profit, and the cost.  Adopting a separable objective function 
in this way allows emphasize to be placed on the necessity for cost minimization given 
that states act efficiently.  It also highlights the relationship between the shape of the cost 
function and existence.  Finally, a sufficient condition for existence of a Nash equilibrium 
which relies on convexity of the cost function is discussed.  For expositional convenience 
the analysis in this Section is pursued from the point of view of state j = 1.  Analogous 
results hold if the decision state is taken to be state 2.   
 
(a) Cost Minimization 
Total expenditure by state 1 on the local public good and the tax/subsidy is given by the 
linear expression, .  Finding the least cost policies which achieve a given 
supply of the mobile factor is the same as solving, for state 1, the following problem:  
1 1 1c q s n= + 1
.
1
1 1 1 1( )
1 1 2 1
 
: ( , )






           (3.1) 
This policy choice problem is analogous to the theory of the firm where firms 
choose inputs to achieve a target level of output at least cost.  The difference in 
interpretation is that here the state chooses policies rather than inputs to achieve a given 
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level of mobile factor supply as opposed to output.  Since 1 1 1 2( , )n n σ σ= is quasi concave, 
provided that total expenditure (cost) is quasi-convex in the policies, there is at least one 
set of efficient (least cost) policies that solve (3.1).8  This is certainly true for the two 
instrument model where .  One can, therefore, be assured of the existence of 
a cost function for state 1 which maps from policy choices, conditional on the policy 
choices of state 2, to the least cost of achieving a desired mobile factor supply.  This cost 
function is defined as: 
1 1 1c q s n= + 1
.
 1
1 1 2 1 1 1 1( )
1 1 2 1
( | )  
: ( , )







    (3.2.)  
The nature of the cost function for the two instrument case can be clarified from 
the point of view of state 1 as follows.  The price of each unit of the monetary subsidy  
is just $1.  Similarly, the cost or price of a unit of a local public good is a constant 
amount
1s
9, again $1.  For a given  expenditure by state 1 is a linear function of  and 
, namely, .  As in the theory of the firm, define the iso-cost line as the 
combinations of  and  with the same expenditure or cost for the state.  The iso-cost 
line can be expressed as .  The difference between this iso-cost line and 
the one encountered in the theory of the firm is that here its slope varies with , which is 
equivalent to the price of an input changing with the level of production.  The slope of the 


















= − .        (3.3) 
  Since 1 1 2( , )n σ σ  is continuous and strictly quasi-concave in 1σ  for any  there 
exists a convex set of policies that will yield a factor supply no less than .  This set is 
defined as .  The boundary of  represents the 
minimum tax/subsidy necessary to yield  for particular values of , given the policies 
1n
1n
1 1( ) { ,l n q s1 1 1 1 2 1| ( , , ) }n q s nσ=
1n
≥




8 If there is more than one set of efficient strategies, each yields the same total cost. 
9 If  is crowded and not produced at a constant marginal cost the per unit price is  where 1q
1 1( )
1 1 1 1( ) / ( )mc q A n
A n  represents crowding and . '1 1( ) 0A n >
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pursued by state 2.  In this paper the boundary is referred to as the iso-n curve to 
highlight the analogy with isoquants from production theory.  The iso-n curves are 
convex to the origin in policy space.  From the mobile factor equilibrium conditions the 
payoff to the mobile factor must be constant along an iso-n curve whose slope is given by 















.        (3.4)  
To continue the analogy with the theory of the firm the left side of (3.4) is the marginal 
rate of technical substitution between the tax/subsidy and the public good for state 1.   
 Since the iso-n curves are convex to the origin in two dimensional policy space 
and the iso-cost curve is linear, there is a unique tangency between any given iso-cost line 
and an iso-n curve.  There is, therefore, a unique least cost policy combination, and, this 
implies the existence of a cost function as defined above.  The iso-n and iso-cost curves, 
together with the least cost policy combinations associated with three possible desired 
quantities of the mobile factor,  and , are shown in Figure 1.   0 11 1,n n
2
1n
Consider iso-n curve .  With the iso-cost curve as drawn the least cost policy 
choice consistent with securing this supply of the mobile factor is  (point A).  This 
is a case where  is negative (a tax).  Now consider iso-n curve .  To obtain this larger 
supply of the mobile factor state 1 must spend more so the iso-cost line is to the right.  
The least cost policy choice which achieves this mobile factor supply is at the point 
where the iso-n curve consistent with  is tangent to the new iso-cost line.  Note,  
however, that as state 1 changes its spending the cost of the public good relative to the 
cost of the subsidy, , decreases.  Hence, the slope of the iso-cost curve declines (  
increases).  This occurs because we are dealing with a public good.  Therefore, the 
optimal policy mix needed to secure the higher mobile factor supply  is something like 
 on the Figure (point B).  Similarly, the optimal policy mix associated with an even 
higher mobile factor supply, such as , is  (point C) where the slope of the iso-c























   
   
 
 
Thus, as state 1 spends more to attract higher levels of the mobile factor the iso-
cost curve shifts to the right and becomes less steep, tracing an -expansion path such as 
ABC in the Figure.  The n-expansion path traces a locus of optimal (least cost) policy 
combinations associated with each quantity of mobile factor in state 1.  There is also a 
total (least) cost curve consistent with the  expansion path which expresses least cost as 
a function of ; this is the cost function 
n
n
C n1n 1 1 2( | )σ  in (3.2).  The total (least) cost curve 
can be of constant slope, implying constant returns with respect to  (a doubling of 
expenditure on the tax/subsidy and the local public good yields double the mobile factor 
supply), convex, implying decreasing returns with regard to  (double the expenditure 
yields less than double the supply of the mobile factor) or concave, implying increasing 

























Figure 1: Least Cost Mobile Factor  
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(b) State Benefits and Costs  
The discussion thus far has not been specific about what particular mobile factor supply a 
state might want.  Rather, it has argued only that some given supply can be achieved at 
least cost using various policy mixes.  The state objective must be broadened in order to 
explain how the state might calculate its desired mobile factor supply.  This requires that 
one take into account any benefits that the state derives from the mobile factor in what 
can be thought of as a state benefit function.  In this expanded objective the state will use 
the benefit function, together with the cost function derived above, to choose its optimal 
supply of the mobile factor.  To achieve this broader objective a state must still choose 
the optimal factor supply at least cost.     
 A state might gain a number of benefits from the mobile factor.  In particular, 
income generated by the mobile factor may accrue to permanent residents based on 
ownership.  Including some fraction of mobile factor income in the state benefit function 
does not invalidate the subsequent analytic techniques, however, it does complicate 
considerably the analysis and this makes the task of highlighting the role of the cost 
function, and in particular, economies of scale in policies, difficult to relate clearly.  
Therefore, a straightforward benefit function is proposed, namely, the excess of state 
output over the mobile factor payment10.  This is commonly thought of as the profit or 
residual accruing to the state, for example, to permanent, immobile, voting, residents.  
For state 1 the benefit function is defined as  
 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( , | ) ( , ) ( , )= −B n f n w n nσ σ σ σ .  (3.5)   
 Condition (2.3) implies that the benefit function is strictly quasi-concave in the 
mobile factor supply.  From the earlier discussion of (2.9) it is clear that 1 1 2( , )n σ σ  is 
strictly quasi-concave in 1σ  and 2σ .  Therefore, the state 1 benefit function 
1 1 1 2( , | )B n σ σ  is strictly quasi-concave in 1σ .   
 The state chooses its policies to maximize the difference between the benefit of a 
given mobile factor supply, as captured by (3.5), and the least cost of achieving that 
supply, as represented by the cost function.  That is, state 1 chooses policies to maximize  
                                                 
10 Thus, in common with Laussel and Le Breton, absentee ownership of mobile factors is implicitly 
assumed. 
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 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2( , | ) ( , | ) ( , | )= −V n B n C nσ σ σ σ σ σ . (3.6) 




The states are assumed to be players within a simultaneous move fiscal competition game 
where strategies are pure and continuous.  It is a game because the strategies chosen by 
one state affect the allocation of the mobile factor across states as well as the total supply  
to the regional bloc, and hence the value of the objective function of the neighboring 
state.  Thus, there is interdependence between states, induced by sharing a common factor 
market and by the integration of the bloc into the world factor market.  Conjectures are 
assumed to be Nash – each state chooses its policies conditional on the choice of its 
neighbor.  For expositional convenience the analysis is again undertaken from the 
perspective of state j (=1,2) with –j referring to the neighboring state (this is maintained 
for the rest of the paper).  The approach is first to define a Nash equilibrium to the fiscal 
competition game and then explain what is sufficient for existence.  This is followed by a 
diagrammatic exposition of the sufficient condition.   
 
(a) A Sufficient Condition 
A Nash equilibrium for state j can be defined as follows: 
 
Nash Equilibrium: State j chooses jσ  to maximize (3.6) conditional on jσ− .  The 
solution (best response) ˆ jσ  can be represented as a correspondence ˆ ˆj j ( )jσ σ σ= −  
between the strategies of state -j and the best response of state j.  This best response 
correspondence is a mapping from S into itself.  A Nash equilibrium is a fixed point to 
that mapping *1* (
*
2, )σ σ σ= , such that 
* *ˆ (j j )jσ σ σ−= .    
  
Commonly existence of a Nash equilibrium * * *(j j j )σ σ σ−=  is assumed, necessary 
conditions are derived from the state objective function that take account of factor 
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mobility and feasibility, and the efficiency properties of the assumed equilibrium are 
examined.   
 However, from (3.6) it is straightforward to see what is sufficient for existence: if 
the cost function of state j is convex in its mobile factor supply then the objective 
function ( , | )j j j jV n σ σ−  is strictly quasi-concave in jσ .  Since the objective function is 
continuous in state policies and the strategy set S is defined on a non-empty, convex and 
compact sub-set of some Euclidean space, we know that a Nash equilibrium exists.  This 
is an application of the theorem on existence of equilibrium in simultaneous move games 
with pure strategies (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995))11.  Note also that 
convexity of the cost function is a sufficient rather than necessary condition for existence.       
 Thus, if the benefit function is concave in the mobile factor supply a sufficient 
condition for existence hinges solely on the convexity of the cost function.  It should be 
pointed out that if one allowed for residential mobile factor ownership this result may 
become more complex (as noted earlier, residential ownership is ruled out).  Permanent 
resident mobile factor ownership means that a share of the marginal product generated by 
the mobile factor accrues to a class of permanent residents, with the exact share 
depending, for example, on a parameter which reflects the level of ownership.  This 
raises the possibility that the state benefit function is not concave in mobile factor supply, 
as is the case where the benefit is simply the residual of the state.  With residential 
ownership cost function convexity alone may therefore not be sufficient as the shape of 
the benefit function will also come into play in determining existence.   
 This is the paper’s key contribution to the issue of existence in fiscal competition 
games.  The idea is now expressed using a diagrammatic approach. 
 
(b) Diagrammatic Exposition  
The diagrammatic exposition commences with Figure 2 where a convex cost function, a 
concave benefit function and the resulting objective function for state j are plotted, 
conditional on some given jσ− .  The objective function ( , | )j j j jV n σ σ−  has a single 
maximum for the case illustrated.  For some given policy vector chosen by state -j, point 
                                                 
11 See page 253 of Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995). 
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A is a ‘best response’ with the desired mobile factor supply of .  The Figure highlights 
the necessity of cost minimization if the state is to maximize its objective 
*
jn
( , | )j j j jV n σ σ−  
- if the state does not choose cost minimizing policies then it cannot maximize this 
objective.  
Figure 2: The Desired Mobile Factor Supply for State j   
 
Benefit/Cost ( | )j j jC n σ−
 
  Existence can be further explained by taking the (least) cost curve and the 
optimal mobile factor supply associated with each cost and benefit curve, and deriving 
(graphically) the best reply curve for state j.  This is done in Figure 3 below where, in 
Panel I, three (least) cost curves for state j are plotted, each one for a different value of 
the policies of its neighbor, jσ− .  (The benefit curve is not depicted since it does not shift 
in response to changes state –j policies).  The first (least) cost curve in Panel I, 
, assumes that the neighbor policies are 1( | )j jC n σ−
1
jσ−  and the associated optimal 
1( , | )jj jB n σ σ−
 jn0 









   
   
mobile factor demand by state j is .   and  are the optimal choices if –j chooses 












In Panel II the function ( ,j j )jn σ σ− , which from proposition 2 is strictly quasi-
concave and continuous in both arguments, is inverted.  This allows the state j policy 
vector to be expressed as a strictly quasi-concave and continuous function of its mobile 
factor supply, conditional on its neighbor’s policy choice, jσ− . Again, three curves are 
illustrated for different values of jσ− , each one corresponding to a (least) cost curve in 
Panel I.  From this it is possible to plot the best reply curve ˆ ˆ (j j j )σ σ σ−=  for state j in 
Panel III.  This yields the state’s best response, ˆ jσ  to any given policy chosen by its 
neighbor.  
 
1( | )j jC n σ−
2( | )
 Benefit/Cost 
j jC n σ−
3( | )j jC n σ−
jn




 2( | )j j jnσ σ−3( | )j j jnσ σ− jσ
 
jσ−
 ( )j j jσ σ σ−=

















   
   
A similar analysis can be undertaken for the neighboring state yielding an 
analogous bounded and continuous best reply curve, ˆ ˆ ( )j j jσ σ σ− −= .  The best response 




If the cost function is convex then there will be at least one intersection yielding an 
equilibrium policy pair such as * *1 2,σ σ  an
                                                
d probably many, that is, multiple equilibria12.  
  
V. Public Goods and Existence 
The previous discussion emphasized that the presence of the public good in the state 
policy vector can lead to increasing returns in the policies and non-convexity of the cost 
 
12 An anonymous referee raised the point that out of equilibrium behavior is an interesting and important 
issue in fiscal competition games.  Our analysis of fiscal competition is constructed as a simultaneous move 
game and we derive sufficient conditions to ensure the existence of a Nash equilibrium to that game.  
Therefore, though interesting, out of equilibrium behavior is outside the scope of our work.  
 
( )j j jσ σ σ−=
 
Figure 4: Best Response Functions 
jσ
( )j jσ jσ σ− −=





   
   
function (Figure 2).  This depends on the degree of ‘publicness’ associated with the 
public good.  The implication is that public goods can create potential problems for 
existence of equilibrium in fiscal competition games.  If the degree of increasing returns 
is sufficiently large equilibrium may not exist.  This idea is now explored using two 
examples, one with quasi linear preferences and the other with Leontieff preferences. 
 
(a) Example 1: Quasi Linear Preferences 
The two states are again indexed by j = 1,2 and the production technology of each is 
j jy n= .  The per unit return to the mobile factor is 1/(2 )jn .  With this technology t
benefit that accrues to the state is once more assumed to be the residual 
he 
  0.5 0.5j j j jB n n= − = n
2
.     (5.1) 
At this point we introduce the notion of ‘effective’ public expenditures to allow 
for the possibility of crowding of the public good.  This example will illustrate that the 
convexity of the cost function, and hence existence, depends on the degree of 
crowdedness.  The effective public expenditure is * /j j jq q n
α=  where the parameter α 
indicates the degree to which the public expenditure is crowded13.  Thus, α = 0 indicates 
zero crowding, α = 0.5 indicates that crowding is proportional to the size of the mobile 
factor supply and α  > 0.5 indicates that crowding (the diminution in effective usefulness) 
occurs faster than proportional to the factor supply.   
The payoff to the mobile factor is a quasi-linear function of the monetary reward 
(the sum of the factor return, , plus the monetary tax/subsidy, ) and the effective 
level of public expenditure,
jw js
14 
  *j j jP w s q= + + j .      (5.2) 
The state j least cost function15 is  
  2(1 )( | ) 0.5 0.25j j j j j j jC n n P n n
ασ −− −= − − .   (5.3) 
                                                 
13 Sometimes this is labeled the publicness of the public good. 
14 The mobile factor payoff function is quasi-concave, not strictly quasi-concave since its Hessian is not 
negative semi-definite. 
15 Consult Annex A for derivation of the cost function. 
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 As discussed earlier there are two polar cases with regard to mobile factor market 
integration.  The first has the mobile factor perfectly mobile between the regional bloc 
and the rest of the world.  In these models the states are considered small relative to the 
world and the equilibrium factor payoff is fixed (for the states) at the world level.  Hence, 
j jP P P−= =  where P  is the world determined value.  For example, the models used in  
Oates and Schwab (1988), Keen and Marchand (1997) and Bucovetsky and Wilson 
(1991)) have this feature.  The second case is one in which the states are isolated from the 
rest of the world and there is a fixed factor supply, n N<  (where N is the given world 
supply), allocated to the regional bloc.  As noted the game played between the states is 
one in which there is competition for the mobile factor and in equilibrium .   j jP P−=
 For the first case with a fixed value of P (full integration) unless α is greater than 
1, that is, unless the public good is ‘super-crowded’, there is some value of , say , 
beyond which least cost is a declining function of the mobile factor supply.  As long as 
the marginal benefit of the factor to the states remains positive, as it does with the 
technology in this example, the net benefit of more mobile factor continues to be positive 




 For the second case with the factor markets of the two states closed to the rest of 
the world, each state, when making its policy choices must account for the change those 
choices will induce in the equilibrium payoff .  An increase in one state's mobile factor 
supply must induce an equal decrease in the other state's supply, and, consequently, 
increase the mobile factor payoff in that state.  Since the factor equilibrium condition 
requires interstate equality of the payoffs, a state must account for the change in this 
payoff when it considers its own option.   
jP
To make this idea concrete once again let n be the total supply of the mobile 




2 2 2 0.125 0.5(1 )(1 2 )
− − − −= + + − − −j j jj j
j j j
d C d P dP
n n
dn dn dn j
n αα α . (5.4) 
                                                 
16 See Annex A for derivation of the second derivative of the cost function and the derivatives of the mobile 
factor payoff function for state -j. 
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It can be shown that the first and second derivatives of jP−  are positive, irrespective of 
the value of α.  By inserting the expressions for the first and second derivatives from 
Annex A, expression (5.4) is 
 
2
5/2 (2 ) 3/2
2
(1 ) 3/2 2
3 ( ) (1 ) ( ) 0.5( )
8
          2 ( ) 0.125 0.5(1 )(1 2 )
− − +
−
− + − −
−
= − + − − + −
+ − + − − −
j
j j j j j j
j
j j j j
d C
n n n n n n q n n
dn








Global convexity of the cost function and the existence of equilibrium is assured if α is at 
least equal to 0.5, that is, if the public good is proportionally, or ‘super crowded’.  
However, if 0.5α <
jn
, the cost function is not globally convex. This is so because for very 
small values of  (for example, ) the final term of (5.5) (negative for0jn → 0.5α < ) 
dominates all the preceding positive terms.  Unless the public good is super crowded 
existence is, therefore, not assured. 
Indeed, many fiscal competition models incorporate the special case of pure local 
public goods, where 0α = .  This case can be explored further using the example.  In this 





3 ( ) 0.5( ) 0.125 0.5
8 j j j jj
d C n n n n n n
dn
− − −= − + − + −   (5.6) 
Because both states are the same in this example the only equilibrium, if it exists, is the 
symmetric one in which each state has half the total supply of the mobile factor.  For the 








−= − .      (5.7) 
This is negative for any value of n greater than 3.1748.   








−= −       (5.8) 
and the second derivative of the net benefit function j jV B C j= −  is   
                                                 
17 See Annex A. 
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−= − + .      (5.9) 
The net benefit function is, therefore, convex for all values of n greater than 3.43414.  
Thus, a model with pure local public goods and symmetric states will only yield an 
equilibrium in which one state ceases to exist. 
 To summarize, this example demonstrates that there may be no equilibrium if 
public goods are not sufficiently crowded.  Without crowding there is no constraint on 
the attractiveness of the public good relative to other policy instruments, as mobile factor 
supply expands, thus creating the possibility that the cost function loses the convexity 
required by the sufficient condition for existence of equilibrium.       
 
(b) Leontief Preferences 
The second example with Leontief preferences gives a little more insight into the 
problem that public goods pose for existence.  Consider the same regional bloc but with 
the mobile factor payoff  represented by a Leontief function, jP
{ }min ( ( ) ,=j jP w n + js q j 2, with the mobile factor equilibrium condition, .  The 
equilibrium condition must encompass the restriction that mobile factor income 
1P P=
( )w n s+  
(since we only consider the symmetric case here the j subscript is also dropped) and the 
public good are in equal proportions for both states.  Now think of the consequence of 
one unit of the mobile factor moving from state 2 to state 1.  Because its factor supply has 
fallen, the state 2 wage increases.  The Nash conjecture is that state 1 believes that the 
policies of state 2 remain unchanged.  If that is the case, the marginal product of the 
mobile factor in state 2 is unchanged by the increased income (public good expenditures 
must rise proportionally).  State 1, in order to attract the additional factor supply, must 
pay a subsidy (reduce its tax) by the exact amount of the increased supply induced wage 
decline.  When the subsidy is changed by that amount, without changing the public good 
expenditure, the mobile factor payoff is the same in both states.  
 Since state costs are c = ns +q, state 1's marginal cost (the additional cost of 
attracting an additional unit of the mobile factor) is 
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 .dC ds dws n s n
dn dn dn
= + = −       (5.10) 




d C ds d s dw d wn
dn dn dn dn dn
= + = − −
2
2n
                                                
    (5.11) 
is important.  If the cost function is to be convex the second derivative must be positive.  
This will be the case if 18| 2 '( ) | "( )w n nw n> . 
 The problem that the public good poses for existence is clear with this quasi-
linear form.  Every dollar of per unit subsidy costs a state n dollars in total costs.  A 
dollar spent on public goods has undiminished benefits regardless of the size of the 
mobile factor supply.   Additions to the mobile factor supply reduce its return, but since 
with the quasi-linear form the marginal rate of substitution between the public good and 
income is independent of the level of income, the value (to the mobile factor) of the 
public good is undiminished when its income falls.  For this reason, states find it 
advantageous to substitute public expenditures on the public good for tax/subsidies as the 
mobile factor supply increases.   
  
(c) Summary 
The examples emphasize that the presence of the pure local public good as a policy 
instrument that provides a benefit to the mobile factor implies that a convex (least) cost 
curve is not assured.  The inclusion of a public good in the policy vector, rather than 
exclusively focusing on taxes and tax competition, has implications for the existence of 
equilibrium; namely, it can violate the sufficient condition that the cost function should 
be convex in the mobile factor supply.   
 There needs to be something associated with the public good that offsets this 
possibility.  On the cost side, one might allow for crowding, as shown in the first 
example, or increasing marginal cost of the public good - we have assumed that it can be 
produced at a constant cost of one, however, rising marginal cost due to decreasing 
 
18 This condition is met naturally for the production function y nα=  and α < 1: for this function 
 with 1( )w n nαα −= 2 -2)n 2'( ) ( 1)  and ''( )  ( -1)( -w n n w nα αα α α α α−= − = .  Thus, 
2''( ) ( 1)( 2)nw n nαα α α −= − − .  Since ( 1)( 2) 2α α− − <  the condition is met. 
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returns in the production of the public good could be incorporated to make the public 
good less attractive with higher levels of mobile factor supply.  Alternatively, there may 
be rigidities in substitutability between the public good and income within the mobile 
factor benefit function, as highlighted by the Leontief example, which make it less 
attractive for a state to use relatively more of the public good to secure higher levels of 
mobile factor supply.    
 
VI. Generalization: Multiple Mobile Factors, States and Instruments 
The generalization includes an arbitrary number of states, indexed by j where j = 1…J, 
within a regional bloc.   The following discussion sets out the production technology used 
within each state, the policy instruments adopted, the nature of factor mobility, and in 
particular how mobile factors of production move between states, and how they migrate 
between the common border of the regional bloc and the rest of the world.       
 In every state there are 1,....,jk jK=  firms each producing a good with a given 
world price.  Thus, the state’s firms are small with respect to the rest of the world.  Every 
product is produced using a strictly quasi-concave, differentiable, production function 
with  distinct mobile inputs.  The amount of mobile input i available world 
wide is a fixed amount, .  The quantity of mobile factor i used by firm  in state j is 
















n n≡∑  
is the quantity of mobile factor i used within the regional bloc.  Naturally  (i.e. the 
regional bloc may, or may not, use the world supply of the factor).   
i ≤ iNn
For every state j there are multiple policy instruments indexed as .  
The policies are continuous in that they can take on all values in a closed continuous 
interval (e.g., tax rates between zero and one).  All feasible policies constitute a bounded 
convex set Sj.  The policy choices, strategies, of a state are designated as vectors 
1, ,j jm M= L
1 2( , , , , ,j j j mj M )jσ σ σ σ σ= L L , j S jσ ∈   The strategy set of all states is 
1 2 JS S S S= × × ×L
1 2( , , , )
.  The vector of feasible policy choices for all states is 
Jσ σ σ σ≡ L S∈σ, .  
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 The feasible strategy sets, , are naturally bounded by the finiteness of the 
resources available.  For instance monetary subsidies paid to mobile factors, cannot 
exceed total production of a state.  Thus, production technology, and the supply of inputs, 
limits state choices.  Taxes are limited to the potential value of the tax base.  Ad valorem 
tax rates, for instance, cannot exceed one.  Since the game has continuous strategies any 
convex combination of two feasible policy vectors is a feasible policy choice.   
'jS s
 Production of any good requires the use of at least one factor but can require the 
use of all or any number in between.  Production technologies can be state specific, either 
because states adopt different production functions or have different fixed factor 
endowments.  Productivity in a state may also depend on state policies.  Public 
infrastructure investment, for instance, can have profound effects on the productivity, and 
thus the profitability, of state industry.  We account for this as in the simple model 
presented earlier by assuming that the mobile factor payoff in state j is a function of the 
state’s public policies.  In this way state policies affect mobile factor supply which in turn 
influences productivity.  
 Each firm in a state has its own production technology represented by a quasi-
concave differentiable production function, of factor inputs and state policies.
jk
F 19  While 
every factor is not necessary to the production of every firm's output, we will write the 
production function with all factors as arguments; this simplifies the discussion to follow.  
An unused factor is termed ‘redundant’.   The output of firm k in state j is 
  1 1( ,..., , , , )= Lj j j jk k k Ik j Hy F n n jσ σ .     (6.1) 





0   and if   0  then 0  and  0j j j
j
jj j j
k k k k
ik
ikik ik ik i k
F F F F
w
n n n n n−
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= ≥ > < >
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
j
j
                                                
, 
where  is the return for mobile factor i used by firm k in state j.  This implies that 




19 The rationale for inclusion of state policies as arguments of the production functions is explained in 
Section IIa. 
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thus, all factors are ‘gross complements’20.  Redundant factors will be those with zero 
marginal products.  Policies are assumed to be either productivity neutral or augmenting, 
 
2 2 2
2 20,  0,  0,  and 0
Kj Kj iKj iKj
mj mj ikj mj mj
F F w w
nσ σ σ σ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
≥ ≤ ≥




  The output of state j is the sum of the value of firm specific outputs: 
 1 2 2j j j Ky y y yλ λ= + + +K .      (6.2) 
Thus, 21, ...,k Kλ λ λ=  is the price of the output of firm k relative to the numeraire output, 
1 jy .  State output is the weighted sum of the output of individual firms and can be written 
as a function of the total supply of each mobile factor of production (since the immobile 
factors are in fixed supply), 
 1 1( ,..., , , , )= Lj jj j k Ik j Mjy y n n σ σ ,     (6.3) 
where jy  is quasi-concave and differentiable.  The above is thought of as a ‘regular 
technology’, namely, each of the firms in a state has a strictly quasi concave production 
function, all factors (mobile and immobile) are complementary, and the output of all 
firms can be aggregated with fixed relative prices into a single numeraire output for a 
state, as given by (6.3). 
Factor markets are perfectly competitive; each factor is paid the value of its 
marginal product.  The return to a given mobile factor of production employed within 



















 , ,i k k∀ −     (6.4) 
where factor i is not redundant.  Since the production function is strictly quasi-concave in 
all non-redundant inputs, and all inputs are gross compliments, the return paid to a factor 
is monotonically decreasing in its own supply and monotonically increasing in the supply 
of all other non-redundant inputs.  Therefore, 








                                                
       (6.5) 
 
20 Such a condition is also used in Keen and Marchand (1997). 
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 The vector of mobile inputs for state j, 1 2[ , , , , ,j j j ijn n n n n ]Ij= L L , includes 
different types of mobile capital and different types of mobile labor.  A mobile factor, be 
it capital or labor, is assumed to have preferences over its state specific return as well as a 
vector of policies, jσ , chosen by the state.  The index 1,.....,m M=  denotes the policies 
used by state j – these would include different types of tax/subsidies and local public 
goods (which may be impure or pure) such as education, health, law and order, 
environmental quality, or economic infrastructure (road and rail transport, ports, 
communications networks). 
 The preferences of mobile factor i are represented by the payoff function 
( , ( ))ij j ij ijp w nσ  which from now on is expressed as  
 ( , )ij j ijP n ijσ ∀ .       (6.6) 
 From Section II (d) the primitive conditions on preferences and technology ensure 
that the payoff function is strictly quasi-concave in jσ , monotonically decreasing in  
and continuous in both arguments.  Within-bloc equilibrium for mobile factor i requires  
ijn
 ( , ) ( , )ij j ij i j j i jP n P n ijσ σ− − −= ∀
i i
.     (6.7) 
As in the simple model  is a non-decreasing function of the payoff received by 
the factor within the bloc.  The within bloc payoff is equal across states so we can define 
 (the supply of mobile factor i to the regional bloc) as a non decreasing function of the 
payoff for the factor within any of the j states 
in
in
  and  ( )( , )i i ij j ijn n P nσ= ∀ in N≤ .    (6.8) 
The two equilibrium conditions (6.7) and (6.8) can be written as an implicit 
function for mobile factor i (recall that i = 1,…,I), 
 ( , , ) ( , ) ( , ( ( , )) ) 0− − −= − −j j j j j j j j j i j jh n P n P n P n n =σ σ σ σ σ .  (6.9) 
 There is a functional relationship between the supply of any particular mobile 
factor in state j and the strategy vector adopted by the state, as shown in the following 
two propositions:  
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Proposition 3: For j S jσ ∈  there is a unique  that satisfies the factor market 
equilibrium conditions in (6.7) and (6.8).  This implies a functional relationship between 
ijn
jσ   and , conditional on the policy vectors adopted by the other states, ijn jσ− .  In turn, 
this implies that we can define 
  ( , )ij j jn ijσ σ− ∀ .      (6.10) 
 
Proof: See Annex B. 
 
Proposition 4: ( , )ij j jn ijσ σ− ∀
j
 is a monotonically increasing, strictly quasi-concave and 
continuous function of σ  and jσ− .   
 
Proof: See Annex B. 
 
 With these results a formal statement of the sufficient conditions for the existence 
of equilibrium in the more general game is possible.  Each state now aims to maximize  
 ( , | ) ( , | ) ( | )j j j j j j j j j j jV n B n C nσ σ σ σ− −= − σ−
)
                                  (6.11) 
Defining the state objective function as ( , )) ( , |j j j j j j jW V nσ σ σ σ− −≡  it is possible to 
demonstrate the following: 
 
Theorem 1: If  is a continuous and strictly quasi- concave function of   
for all states j, then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. 




Proof: If  is a continuous and strictly quasi-concave function of for all 
states j, then, because 
( , |j j j jV n σ σ−
(n
jn
, )−j j jσ σ is continuous and strictly quasi-concave in jσ  for all 
states (propositions 3 and 4), ( ),j j jW σ σ−  is continuous and strictly quasi-concave in jσ  
for all states.  The policy game with inter-state fiscal competition is then defined on a 
non-empty, convex and compact Euclidian strategy space, S, and each state’s objective is 
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a continuous and strictly quasi-concave function of its own strategies.  It follows that a 
pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists for the fiscal competition game 21.//  
 
Theorem 2: (Sufficient Condition for Existence): A sufficient condition for theorem 1 to 
be satisfied is that the benefit function for state j should be concave in  and the cost 




Proof: Since ( )jB ⋅  and  are continuous functions of , ( )jC ⋅ jn ( ),j j jW σ σ−  is continuous 
and strictly quasi-concave in jσ  if ( )jB ⋅  is a quasi-concave function of  and if jn ( )jC ⋅  is 
a convex function of //.  jn  i∀
 
 Thus, as in the simple model with two instruments, one mobile factor and two 
states, in a regional bloc with multiple policy instruments, states and mobile factors, the 
sufficient condition for existence still depends on convexity of the cost function 
underlying the state’s (separable) objective function, given that the benefit component of 
the objective is taken to be concave in mobile factor supplies.   
 
VII. Conclusion. 
A fiscal competition game with two states, one mobile factor of production, and two 
policy instruments has been constructed in this paper.  The model captures many of the 
features of the standard model found in the fiscal competition literature.  It is shown that 
various concavity and continuity conditions arise from the mobile factor equilibrium 
conditions based on the primitives of the production technology and preferences.  A 
separable state welfare function is then developed in which states choose a tax/subsidy 
and expenditure on a local public good which is productivity enhancing and benefits the 
mobile factor.  Policies are chosen to maximize the difference between state benefit and 
the least cost (as represented by a cost function) of achieving the desired quantity of the 
mobile factor.   
                                                 
21 Once again see Mas Colell, Whinston and Green, page 253. 
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If concavity of the benefit part of the state welfare function is taken as given 
existence of equilibrium is shown to depend purely on the convexity of the cost function.  
The paper then shows that convexity, and hence existence, are not assured when local 
public goods are included in the strategy set of the states, and states use these public 
goods (as well as tax/subsidies) to compete with one another for mobile factors.  Local 
public goods create economies of scale and problems for existence of equilibrium in 
fiscal competition games unless the public goods are super crowded.  This is 
demonstrated in two examples, one with quasi linear preferences and the other with 
Leontieff preferences.   
These results are also generalized to a model of a regional bloc with multiple 
states, mobile factors and policy instruments.  The results on existence are then stated and 
proved for this generalized model using two theorems.   
Use of the dual where states choose their policies to attract desired quantities of 
mobile factors at least cost, and allowing local public goods to enhance productivity of 
mobile factors are new ways of thinking about fiscal competition.  The advantage of 
adopting this approach is to simplify the sufficient condition for existence and facilitate 
emphasis on the problem that public goods pose for existence, namely, non convexity of 
the cost function.  With duality the sufficient condition is stated in terms of a 
straightforward convexity condition on the cost function underlying a state’s objective.  
Finally, the results suggest that non existence of Nash equilibrium in fiscal 
competition games is potentially a serious issue, especially in models where states have 
access to public goods which are insufficiently crowded.  It makes no sense to examine 
the properties of models where there is no equilibrium.  Fiscal competition models 
developed in future should explicitly consider existence prior to embarking on analyses 
of equilibrium outcomes, and drawing conclusions about the efficiency properties of 
fiscal competition.  A fruitful way to proceed is to make use of the dual approach with a 
separable objective function which can be checked for the necessary convexity conditions 
described in this paper.         
     
Annex A:  Derivations Referred to in Footnotes 11, 12 and 13. 
 
Footnote 11: Derivation of Cost Function (Quasi Linear Preferences) 
Letting effective public expenditure be * /j j jq q n
2α=  and the payoff to the mobile factor 
be /j j j jP w s q nj
α= + +  then we have: 

















= −   (slope of iso cost line)   (2) 
Equating the two leads to a solution for the optimal ‘effective’ public good provision: 
        (3) 1(0.5 )j jq n
α−= 2
And hence the optimal tax/subsidy: 
 1 20.5 / 0.5j j j js P n n
α−
−= − − .      (4) 
Using (3) and (4) in the iso cost equation j j jC n s q j= +  yields the least cost function: 
 2(1 )( | ) 0.5 0.25j j j j j j jC n n P n n
ασ −− −= − − .    (5) 
 
Footnote 12: Derivatives of the Cost Function (Quasi Linear Preferences) 
From (5) above (or (5.3) in the main text) we obtain: 
 (1 2 )0.25 / 0.5(1 )j jj j j j
j j
dC dP
P n n n
dn dn




2 2 2 0.125 0.5(1 )(1 2 )
− − − −= + + − − −j j jj j
j j j
d C d P dP
n n
dn dn dn j
n αα α  (2) 









P n n s
n n α
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n n q n n
dn
αα− − −−= − + −
+ >    
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5/ 2 (2 )





n n q n n
dn
αα α− − −−= − + − −
+ >   (4) 
 
Footnote 13: Second Derivative of Benefit Function (Quasi Linear Preferences) 
Let  
 0.5j jB n=         (1) 
The first derivative is  





= >        (2) 











−= − < .      (3) 










−= − < .      (4) 
 
     
Annex B: Proofs for Propositions 3 and 4 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  For fixed Sσ ∈  the factor market equilibrium conditions 
represent a mapping from the set  into itself.  The continuity of the mapping and the 
compactness and convexity of N ensure that there is at least one fixed point, n*, of that 
mapping. 
iN
 Suppose there is more than one solution, say two n* and n', then, without loss of 
generality, there is at least one .  Since the factor market is regular, the payoffs to 
all other factors, but factor i (-i), are higher in state j with * than with '.  Consequently to 
maintain factor market equilibrium the payoffs to all other factors must be higher in all 
states.  The implication of higher payoffs for –i factors needs to be examined in the case 
of a fixed supply of factors in the federation and the case in which factors can move in 




 For fixed federation factor supply implication of –i higher payoffs, since factor 
markets are regular, is that the supply of factor i in all states (the use of factor i in all 
industries in all states) must be higher in * than in ' .  This is impossible since it would 
violate fixed supply: a contradiction. 
 For variable federation factor supply, by reasoning similar to the fixed supply 
case, more of each factor must be attracted to the federation with * than with '.  This 
means that all factor payoffs must be larger with * than with '.  Since the state strategies 
are fixed, the wage to every factor must be higher with * than with '.  Let the marginal 
product of a typical firm in a state be Fj(nj) and let its Hessian matrix of second derivative 
be Dj.  Let dnj and dwj be column vectors of changes in factor use and changes in factor 
wages respectively.  The change in factor wage is related to the change in factor use in 
the following way 
   Dj dnj = dwj.. 
The quadratic form is then 
                    dnj' Dj dnj = dnj' dwj. 
Because the production function is strictly quasi concave the left hand side of the 
equation is negative and for there to be two solutions to the market equilibrium 
conditions the right hand side must be negative: a contradiction.  /// 
   
   
Proof of Proposition 4: Define { }( , ) | ( , , ) 0j j j j j jL n h nσ σ σ σ− −= =  as the level set of 
state j strategy vectors that satisfy (6.9) for given jσ−  and jn .  [Another way to define 
the level set is as follows - it is the set of values of jσ  that satisfies the equation 
0 ( , )0j j j jn n σ σ−=  where the 0 superscript indicates fixed values of jn  and jσ .  From this 
we then have that { }0 0( , ) 0 0| ( , )j j j j j j jn nσ σ σ σ− −= =L n .  Notice that ( , )j j jnP σ  is the same 
for all ( , )j j jnLσ σ−∈  for a given values of jn ].  
 
 (a) Concavity 
Define 0 1(1 )= + −j j
λσ λσ λ σ  for  and . 0 1, ( ,−∈j j j jL nσ σ σ ) 10 ≤λ≤
Because jP  is concave in jσ , thus and  is 
continuous and monotonically increasing in 
0( , ) ( ,>j j j j j jP n P n
λσ σ ) ( )h ⋅
jP . 
   ( , , ) 0− ≥j j jh n
λσ σ
  There exists a unique in
λ  such that  
  . ( , , ) 0j j jh n
λ λσ σ− =
  Because  is monotonically decreasing in ( )h ⋅ jn  
  . ≥j jn n
λ
Therefore ( , ) ( ,− ≥j j j j j jn n
λ )−σ σ σ σ  and  is strictly quasi concave in jn
jσ .   
 
(b) Continuity 
We now show that the function ( )jn ⋅ is continuous in jσ  for given 
j jσ σ− −= .  The same argument applies to showing that is continuous 
in 
( )j ⋅n
jσ− .  Suppose ( )jn ⋅ is not a continuous function of jσ . Then there are 
at least two distinct sequences, 
   mj( )   and  ( )
k
j k j m jS Sσ σ∈ ∈
 ii
   
   
 iii
that converge to the same value  
  lim( ) lim( )k mj k j m jk m Sσ σ σ→∞ →∞= = j∈  
such that  
  'lim (( ) , )kij j k j jk n nσ σ−→∞ =  
and  ' 'j jn n<
'
  ''lim (( ) , )mj j m jm n nσ σ−→∞ j= . 
From the definition of ( )h ⋅   
  ( , , ( , )) ( , , ( , )) 0 ,k k m mj j j j j j j j j jh n h nσ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ− − − −= = k m∀ . 
By the continuity of ( )h ⋅  
  'lim ( , , ( , )) ( , , ) 0k kj j j j j j j jk h n h nσ σ σ σ σ σ− − −→∞ = =  
and 
  ''lim ( , , ( , )) ( , , ) 0m mj j j j j j j jm h n h nσ σ σ σ σ σ− − −→∞ = = . 
But 
  ' ' ' '( , , ) ( , , )j j j j j jh n h nσ σ σ σ− −> . 
The contradiction proves the assertion that ( )jn ⋅ is continuous in jσ  for 
fixed j jσ σ− −= .// 
 
(c) Increasing 
  Because  is monotonically increasing in ( )jP ⋅ jσ  and  is   
  monotonically increasing in (
( )jn ⋅
)jP ⋅ , it follows that (jn )⋅  is monotonically  
  increasing in jσ  
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